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In light of its rift with Ukraine and tensions with the West, Moscow is seeking 
a more influential role in the post-Soviet space and is reorienting its policy 
towards Asia. Rather than breaking with the West, Russia wants to reposition 
itself as a central Eurasian great power. In order to gain influence in “Greater 
Eurasia” and accrue additional international leverage, Russia has led the way 
in creating the Eurasian Economic Union, a surprisingly robust multilateral 
organization that is reshaping the regional geopolitical and economic land-
scape. Eurasia is changing. It is time for Europe to pay attention.
The presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signing the treaty which established the Eura-
sian Economic Union in Astana, May 29, 2014. Mikhail Klimentyev/RIA Novosti/Kremlin /Reuters
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Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
never made it a secret that he consid-
ers the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
a “major geopolitical disaster,” and 
he has, on numerous occasions, spo-
ken out in favor of closer association 
among former Soviet republics.1 Russia 
has in recent years stepped up its efforts 
to secure its influence in the post-So-
viet space, and has done this increas-
ingly also through the strengthening 
of multilateral regional organizations, 
namely the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), consisting of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 
It would be misleading to see Rus-
sian integration efforts simply as an 
attempt at restoring the old Soviet 
Union. While the EAEU has turned 
into the most successful regional inte-
gration project since the Soviet Union’s 
break-up in 1991, Moscow’s ultimate 
goal is not so much to reconstruct a 
strong supranational state, like the So-
viet Union, but to maintain as much 
control as possible over developments 
in its post-Soviet vicinity. Facing chal-
lenges from an expanding European 
Union in the west, and China’s rise in 
the east, Moscow aims to use multilat-
eral organizations like the EAEU as yet 
another tool in its efforts to strengthen 
Russia’s position in an ever more com-
petitive international environment. 
Russia wants to perform the role of 
Eurasia’s doorkeeper, making sure the 
states of the region remain within its 
sphere of influence and preventing 
them from joining Western insti-
tutions. At the same time, through 
regional alliances, Moscow seeks to 
boost its standing in world affairs, 
hoping to increase its leverage when 
engaging with other powerful states 
and organizations. 
Russia’s position in post-Soviet Eur-
asia is still uncertain, and remains 
contingent upon the interests of the 
states of the region, as well the behav-
ior of outside powers. Even though 
some of Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors 
are now tied closely within the frame-
work of the EAEU and other regional 
organizations, they are nevertheless 
unwilling to give up their political 
sovereignty, and also want to see a tan-
gible profit from their association with 
Russia. The Kremlin understands that 
coercion might backfire, and that it 
needs to make sure the Russian-dom-
inated EAEU is successful and attrac-
tive to all of its members, and not 
seen as serving Russian interests only. 
While Russia will not allow any mem-
ber to leave the union, the bargaining 
power of states associated with Russia 
is not necessarily weak. Also, while 
Russia still is the most important ac-
tor within the post-Soviet space, Mos-
cow faces competition in the region 
as other states, and especially China, 
have been making increasing inroads. 
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Through regional organizations such 
as the EAEU, Russia hopes to contain 
Chinese influence, especially in Cen-
tral Asia, and develop a more coordi-
nated approach towards China and 
other powers engaged in the region. 
This chapter looks into the nature of 
current integration processes in the 
post-Soviet space. Though Russia 
cannot and will not abandon Europe 
any time soon, the shift towards Asia, 
and Moscow’s efforts to strengthen 
ties with its neighbors, will ultimately 
have consequences for Russia’s inter-
national standing and relations with 
the West and Asia. While Europe-
an-Russian economic relations have 
suffered due to political tensions, 
trade between the EAEU and Asia has 
increased significantly. Also, with the 
US engaged in a trade war with Chi-
na, economic cooperation and trade 
in the larger Eurasian and Asia-Pacific 
region is likely to continue to expand. 
It is time that Europe, which has so 
far rejected entering into a dialogue 
with the EAEU, reconsidered its pol-
icy. Otherwise, Europe might be pass-
ing up economic opportunities, and 
Russia and the whole of Eurasia will 
continue to drift eastward.
Russia and the Post-Soviet Space
Russia has always considered the 
post-Soviet space to be a zone of vital 
interest. While officially recognizing 
the former Soviet states’ indepen-
dence, Moscow has accepted its neigh-
bors’ sovereignty only insofar as their 
policies are not seen as detrimental 
to Russian national interests and its 
claim of regional predominance. As a 
putative great power, Russia sees this 
claim legitimated by common histo-
ry and culture, ethnic, economic and 
political ties, as well as larger security 
considerations. During most of the 
1990s and well into the 2000s, Russia 
did not pursue an active integration-
ist policy. If Russia was economically 
weak, its neighbors were still weaker, 
and Moscow was able to maintain 
its hegemonic position and dictate 
the terms of relationships. Russia 
felt comfortable with the situation as 
it was and saw no need to push for 
re-integration. Moreover, Russia’s fo-
cus was rapprochement with the West 
and the broadening of trade and eco-
nomic ties with Europe. 
It was from early 2000s onwards 
that Russia set out on a more proac-
tive policy towards the states in its 
immediate neighborhood. This was 
connected with three major develop-
ments: First, under Vladimir Putin’s 
presidency, Russia became politically 
and economically much more stable 
than during the Yeltsin years, and due 
to higher incomes from the sale of oil 
and gas abroad, the Russian state had 
also more resources at its disposal to 
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Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus, de-
cided to transform the Collective 
Security Treaty (established in 1992) 
into a military alliance, the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). While this organization has 
not yet turned into an effective, fully 
fledged security alliance like NATO, 
the individual members have com-
mitted themselves to working to-
gether more closely, they are regularly 
holding common military exercises 
and, most importantly, Russia or any 
other CSTO member has the right 
to veto the establishment of new for-
eign military bases in CSTO-member 
states. Also, in 2007 the organization 
concluded an agreement with anoth-
er major security organization, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), which has developed into an 
important forum for dialogue among 
all the main powers of the Asia-Pacific 
region on security, political, and eco-
nomic issues.2 
The empowering of existing regional 
organization such as the CSTO and 
the conclusion of agreements with 
other regional organizations indicat-
ed the new course of Russian foreign 
policy at the time: Moscow wished 
to strengthen those regional organi-
zations it was able to dominate and 
sought to build up relations with 
other states and organizations. As in 
support an active foreign policy. Second, 
while Russia was stabilizing under Pu-
tin’s increasingly authoritarian leader-
ship, the Kremlin saw itself confronted 
with democratic upheavals and regime 
change in its near abroad. The revolu-
tions in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine 
2004 and (to some extent) in Kyrgyz-
stan in 2005 brought new elite groups 
to power, which were reform-minded 
and sought cooperation with the West. 
Third, and most importantly, Western 
states and organizations made inroads 
into the post-Soviet space. The Baltic 
states became members of North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
2004, and both the European Union 
and NATO concluded partnership 
agreements with a number of other 
post-Soviet states. At the same time, 
China became more engaged econom-
ically, especially in Central Asia. Russia 
lost some of its leverage in the sphere 
of energy transportation, as a number 
of pipelines were built circumvent-
ing Russian territory with the help of 
foreign companies. While gas and oil 
from Azerbaijan is now reaching West-
ern markets via Georgia and Turkey, 
oil and gas pipelines connect Central 
Asia directly with China.
Towards Multilateral Integration
As Russia saw the post-Soviet zone 
slipping from its grasp, the Kremlin 
reacted: In 2002, under Moscow’s 
lead, six former Soviet republics, 
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eight members of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Moldavia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, agreed on the formation 
of a free trade area. A year later, Rus-
sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan deepened 
economic integration by organizing 
the Common Economic Space. On 
May 29, 2014, the presidents of the 
three states signed a treaty establish-
ing the EAEU, and on January 1, 
2015, when the agreement came into 
force, Armenia and (in August 2015) 
Kyrgyzstan joined the organization.4
From Greater Europe to  
Greater Eurasia
For most Russian foreign policy spe-
cialists, the idea of Eurasia remained 
marginal until it was reinvigorated by 
Vladimir Putin during his tenure as 
Russian prime minister. In an article 
the field of security, various econom-
ic groupings with shifting numbers 
of countries were created during the 
1990s, but these organizations were 
not very effective. Beginning in the 
early 2000s, Russia began to count-
er the influence of outside powers by 
strengthening its economic position 
with the help of some of Russia’s large 
state-controlled energy companies, 
including Gazprom, Lukoil and RAO 
UES.3 It was only in 2008 – 2009, 
however, that Moscow intensified its 
integration efforts in a multilateral 
framework. 
Based on the Eurasian Economic 
Community organized in 2000 by 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, integration was 
intensified with the launch of a cus-
tom’s union in 2010, joined also by 
Armenia (but not Tajikistan). In 2011, 
Regional Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space 
As of December 2018
Sources: CSTO; CIS; Eurasian Economic Commission; SCO; Union State 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
Union State














S T R A T E G I C  T R E N D S  2 0 1 9
weight to the Asian vector in its for-
eign and economic policy. Russia’s 
turn to the East started before the 
Ukraine crisis and as a result of Chi-
na’s economic rise. But the Ukraine 
crisis accelerated Moscow’s geopoliti-
cal reorientation. In a symbolic move 
and in order to underline Asia’s new 
importance, in May 2014 Moscow 
and Beijing signed a 30-year deal 
worth 400 billion USD to deliver gas 
from Russia to China via a new pipe-
line, finalizing an agreement that had 
been negotiated on and off for nearly 
twenty years.6 
In line with Russia’s domestic dis-
course regarding the right to a follow 
its own, “sovereign” path to democra-
cy, the alignment with China dove-
tailed with the country’s quest for a 
“sovereign” path in its foreign policy. 
As highlighted in a report by a group 
of leading Russian foreign policy ex-
perts, strengthening cooperation with 
China seemed not only politically 
and economically advantageous, but 
also marked a “moral” turn, as both 
countries were seeking “to promote 
a non-Western pattern of global de-
velopment”, striving to protect their 
“national sovereignty” and increasing 
“their influence.”7 Russia was not clos-
ing its doors to Europe, but “the Great 
Eurasian” project was now also open 
to China, as Putin declared during the 
2016 Petersburg Economic Forum.8
published in Izvestiia in October 2011, 
Putin provided the idea of Eurasia with 
a new conceptual framework.5 Reject-
ing the notion that the formation of 
a new union among post-Soviet states 
was to be seen as a “revival of the So-
viet Union,” he suggested that a “pow-
erful supranational association” was 
capable of becoming “one of the poles 
in the modern world.” Trying to dif-
fuse the notion that a future Eurasian 
Union might be seen as an attempt to 
“cut ourselves off” or to “stand in op-
position to anyone,” Putin presented 
this project as part of a future “Greater 
Europe” stretching from “Lisbon to 
Vladivostok.” 
Essentially, what Putin proposed was 
the establishment of a free trade area 
between the European Union and 
the emerging Russian-dominated 
Eurasian bloc. This idea, however, 
received a blow in the aftermath of 
the Ukraine crisis and the ousting of 
president Viktor Yanukovich in Feb-
ruary 2014, when it became clear that 
the new Ukrainian leadership hoped 
to establish closer relations with Eu-
rope. Sanctioned and isolated by the 
West in retaliation for the annexation 
of Crimea and military support for 
pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, 
Moscow needed to adjust its Eurasian 
strategy. The Kremlin intensified ef-
forts to strengthen its influence in 
the post-Soviet space, and gave more 
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Eurasian space. Many in Russia be-
lieve that, by forming coalitions with 
other powerful states, Moscow will 
have more leverage in dealing with 
Brussels.9 Russia’s turn to the East is, 
in part, an attempt to gain interna-
tional leverage and eventually form a 
more equal relationship with Europe. 
Potential and Limits of  
Eurasian Integration
From Moscow’s point of view, build-
ing Greater Eurasia means that Russia 
remains at the center of everything 
that is going on in its immediate 
neighborhood, or what Russian offi-
cials call the larger “Russian World” 
(Russkii mir). If Russia’s goal is to pre-
vent its neighbors from independent-
ly forming trade and political connec-
tions, Moscow will need to maintain 
control over regional developments. 
Russia has therefore been striving to 
deepen mutual interdependencies 
and to tie its neighbors together in an 
increasingly dense network of mili-
tary, security, political, and economic 
relations. The EAEU is not the only, 
but currently the most important tool 
for fostering closer regional allianc-
es and ensuring continued Russian 
dominance. 
The prevailing view among Western 
observers is that the EAEU is not an ef-
fective regional organization compara-
ble to the European Union, but rather 
This rhetorical shift highlighted the 
fact that Asia had gained in economic 
importance for Russia. However, the 
Kremlin knew it could not afford to 
break with Europe; this would have 
been economically damaging and 
clashed with the country’s cultural 
identity. Also, while Asia has become 
more important to Moscow as an 
economic partner, Russia is still only 
a minor factor for most Asian coun-
tries. There is still a mismatch between 
the declared political goals of closer 
Chinese-Russian relations and actual 
Chinese investment, especially when 
it comes to Russia’s underdeveloped 
Far Eastern territories, which border 
China and are in need of investment. 
Moreover, while Russia is part of Bei-
jing’s Belt and Road Initiative, which 
aims to build up infrastructure in or-
der to link China with Europe and 
other global markets, it is not central 
to the undertaking, as most of the 
projects are in Central Asian states and 
Kazakhstan in particular.
Russia’s shift to Asia acknowledges new 
geo-economic realities, but should also 
be seen as a narrative strategy and func-
tion of its policy towards Europe: Giv-
en the tensions with the West and the 
fact that Brussels is not interested in a 
dialogue with Moscow or the EAEU, a 
plausible way to get back to Europe is 
through Asia and through the strength-
ening of its position in the post-Soviet 
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and workforce; they also agree on the 
specifics of the decision-making pro-
cess and the set-up of an institutional 
architecture, which is largely modeled 
on the European Union. While the 
most important decisions are taken 
by the Supreme Eurasian Econom-
ic Council, which is comprised of 
the heads of its member states, the 
daily work is carried out by the Eur-
asian Economic Commission (EEC), 
which is a permanent body based in 
Moscow, and consists of two repre-
sentatives of each member state. Oth-
er important governing bodies of the 
EAEU include the Interstate Council, 
at the level of heads of governments, 
and the EAEU Court of Justice, which 
is based in Minsk.13 
As with all multilateral organizations, 
removing internal barriers on trade 
and the movement of goods, services 
and people infringes upon national 
sovereignty. The fact that the EAEU 
has achieved harmonization of ex-
ternal customs tariffs means that de-
cision-making about tariff issues has 
now been effectively transferred from 
the national states to the union level. 
The EAEU has also managed to abol-
ish, at least to a large degree, internal 
customs borders and has reduced in-
ternal constraints on labor mobility 
and capital movement. Even though 
the EAEU’s existence has been marked 
by petty trade wars, economic crises, 
a Russian-controlled group of states 
which would rather align with Brussels, 
if they were given the possibility. Ac-
cordingly, there is skepticism that the 
EAEU will turn into an effective mul-
tilateral organization, as none of the 
members, including Russia, seem will-
ing to cede substantial power to a su-
pranational body.10 Others doubt that 
an organization dominated by authori-
tarian states will achieve much in terms 
of integration, as the removal of inter-
nal barriers on trade and the movement 
of goods, people, and services usually 
demands a certain openness, the appli-
cation of the rule of law, and economic 
liberalization, none of which is in the 
interest of authoritarian rulers.11 Some 
point out that in authoritarian states, 
loyalties tend to be with the respective 
national political leaderships, and in 
case of disagreements, EAEU bureau-
crats might prefer not to take risks and 
to stick with decisions taken by their 
respective governments.12
Even though it is likely the EAEU will 
face obstacles as it develops further, no 
other multilateral organization created 
in the post-Soviet space has achieved 
a higher degree of integration. The 
EAEU treaty is a technical document 
with no overarching ideology or spe-
cific values inscribed. The signatories 
pledge to deepen economic integra-
tion and remove barriers to the free 
movement of goods, services, capital 
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operators unrestricted and equal 
access to energy networks in other 
EAEU countries. Also by 2025, the 
EAEU plans to eliminate all obsta-
cles and limitations to transport via 
road, rail and water. For the purpose 
of creating a unified transport zone 
and a common internal market for 
transport services, the EAEU aims to 
create a uniform electronic transport 
control system. The member states 
have also agreed to establish a com-
mon supranational body on financial 
market regulation by 2025 in order to 
ensure the regulation of a future uni-
fied financial markets.
and disputes over trading rules, there 
has been progress as well: For exam-
ple, the EAEU recently succeeded in 
creating a common market for the free 
circulation of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, after agreements were reached 
on common standards regarding reg-
istration, production, and handling of 
medicine. 
Especially ambitious is the EAEU’s 
plan to create a common energy mar-
ket. By 2019, the union envisions a 
common electricity market, and, by 
2025, a common market for oil and 
gas. If realized, this would give EAEU 
Economic Ties Between EAEU Members in 2017
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission
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community of equals, but about in-
dividual states associating themselves 
with Russia. In the EAEU, Russia is 
accounting for some 87 percent of the 
union’s total GDP, and makes up for 
some 80 percent of the EAEU’s popu-
lation.15 Russia’s annual military bud-
get exceeds the combined spending of 
all the other EAEU members by a fac-
tor of twenty. Because of these mas-
sive regional asymmetries, the cost 
of a member state dissociating itself 
from Russia could be very high. As 
the Ukrainian case has demonstrat-
ed: leaving or staying is potentially a 
matter of war and peace, and it seems 
that the individual EAEU members 
are well aware of this. Having learned 
from the Ukraine experience, leaving 
the union was never on the agenda of 
the new leaders who came to power 
after Armenia’s “velvet revolution” in 
spring 2018. 
The member countries are thus very 
careful in dealing with Russia, and are 
mindful of the Kremlin’s sensitivities. 
But since they know how important 
this union-project is to Russia politi-
cally, they also have a fairly large ma-
neuvering room, and their negotiating 
position via-a-vis Moscow is not nec-
essarily weak. For example, every time 
Russia’s closest ally, Belarus (which 
is united with Russia in the frame-
work of the Russia-Belarus Union 
State created in 1997), does not get 
Given the amount of work already 
done, as well as the institutional struc-
ture put in place, it seems unlikely that 
the EAEU will falter any time soon. 
The bureaucratic apparatus of the EEC 
has grown to over 2000 employees; 
this body, which is currently chaired 
by former Armenian prime minister 
Tigran Sargsyan, is taking over re-
sponsibility of an increasing amount 
of laws.14 Therefore, the more realistic 
scenario is that the EAEU will increase 
its degree of integration, achieve fur-
ther positive economic results, and 
continue to forge trade agreements 
with other states and organizations. 
In fact, after the difficult initial years, 
the economy within the EAEU-zone 
is showing signs of recovery. Further 
positive news will make the project 
more attractive, not only to current 
members, but to third parties as well. 
For example, Uzbekistan, although 
not a formal EAEU member, is cur-
rently harmonizing its import tariffs 
with EAEU norms. In 2017, Moldo-
va became the first state to be granted 
official observer status to the EAEU. 
In the meanwhile, over a dozen states 
and several international organizations 
have concluded cooperation agree-
ments with the EAEU.
The Russian Challenge
The challenge with this type of in-
tegration is that the EAEU is not so 
much about joining together in a 
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restrictions a common regime would 
usually impose. At the same time, 
however, Russia also understands that 
especially since the Ukraine crisis, its 
neighbors react more sensitive to any 
form of real or perceived political and 
economic pressure. 
Although it is clear that Russia, as the 
most powerful of all the members, has 
the largest amount of influence over 
the decision making process with-
in the union, the key decisions are 
reached in consensus among all heads 
of states and it would be wrong to as-
sume that Russia can simply ignore 
the interests of others. In fact, by pro-
moting the EAEU as an institution 
which serves to protect the interests 
of all of its participants, Moscow is 
well aware that coercion as a means 
to keep the union together is likely to 
backfire, and therefore tries to allevi-
ate these countries’ fears of Russian 
dominance. While Russia wants to 
avoid that integration becomes a bur-
den to its own economy, it also needs 
to make sure the union is successful 
and not seen primarily as a Russian 
dominated project, obliging Russian 
goals only. 
The Rationale to Join the Union
Even though Putin has been stressing 
the economic advantages of deeper in-
tegration among former Soviet repub-
lics, it seems quite clear that Moscow’s 
from Russia what it wants, it threat-
ens to boycott integration projects and 
Russia, which is not interested in yet 
another conflict, usually tries to ac-
commodate Belarussian interests, for 
example by lowering energy prices or 
by writing off debts. Notwithstanding 
membership in the EAEU, both Ka-
zakhstan and Armenia have concluded 
an Agreement on Comprehensive and 
Enhanced Partnership (CEPA) with 
the European Union, which is in fact 
a “light” version of the EU Associa-
tion Agreement with the prominent 
exception of sections on trade policy, 
which are now in the competence of 
the EAEU. Kazakhstan also continues 
to negotiate deals with China, and has 
been one of the key drivers behind the 
idea to reactivate the establishment of 
a union among all the five post-Soviet 
Central Asian states. 
But Russia too, at times puts its eco-
nomic interests above those of the 
union. When the other members of 
the union declined to follow Rus-
sia imposing punitive measures in 
response to EU economic sanctions 
against Russia for its aggressive ac-
tions in Ukraine in 2014, or did not 
support sanctions imposed by Russia 
on Turkey in 2015, Russia ignored 
this and went ahead imposing its 
own sanctions on Western (and later 
Turkish) goods. If Russia sees its in-
terests at risk, it tends to disregard the 
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accounting for only 14.6 percent of 
total trade in 2017 (for comparison: 
in the EU, around 64 percent of trade 
was between members of the union in 
2017).17 
Even though the external trade of 
most individual members is much 
higher than internal trade (in the case 
of Russia and Kazakhstan, this is due 
to the fact that these countries export 
most of their oil and gas outside the 
EAEU-area), there still is a certain 
logic in fostering closer cooperation, 
namely due to strong legacies from 
the past, which manifest themselves 
not only in integrated rail and road 
transportation networks, energy con-
nections and common technical stan-
dards originating from Soviet times, 
but also in the socio-cultural sphere. 
It is telling, in this respect, that even 
though the economic success of 
primary interest was never so much in 
the economic side of the project (af-
ter all, the current union accounts for 
only about 6 percent of Russia’s overall 
trade), but the larger geopolitical and 
geo-economic gains. Following the 
logic that “great powers do not dissolve 
in some other integration projects but 
forge their own,”16 Russia has been 
seeking to establish the union as an 
important international actor and eco-
nomic heavyweight in order to raise its 
own standing in world affairs. In fact, 
given Russia’s importance to all of the 
member states, most of the trade and 
other economic issues could be dealt 
with bilaterally between Russia and the 
individual states of the region. This is 
especially true for Belarus, whose trade 
is almost exclusively with Russia, but 
not with other EAEU members. The 
overall level of internal trade among 
the member states is still relatively low, 
External and Internal Trade: The EU and the EAEU Compared 
2017
Sources: Eurostat; Eurasian Economic Commission; Ricardo Giucci, Anne Mdinaradze, “Die Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion. Analyse 
aus einer handelspolitischen Perspektive”, Berlin Economics (2017). 
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rules-based organization, fearing that 
Moscow could one day lay claims to 
the northern, Russian populated part 
of Kazakhstan. Armenia joined be-
cause of Russian pressure, but also be-
cause of promises of cheap energy and 
protection against Azerbaijan, Arme-
nia’s main antagonist in the conflict 
over Nagorno Karabakh. Belarus re-
lies to a significant degree on continu-
ous shipment of cheap Russian oil and 
gas. Russia is the primary destination 
for labor migration, mostly from the 
Central Asian members and Armenia, 
and economically weak countries like 
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia depend to a 
large degree on Russian investments 
and loans from the Eurasian Develop-
ment Bank (which includes all EAEU 
members and Tajikistan). Therefore, 
integration has been moderate so far, 
the populations of individual member 
states seem to have a largely favorable 
view of regional integration.
Another major reason is that by join-
ing the union, these states were also ac-
commodating various other interests: 
the bulk of Kazakhstan’s external trade 
is currently with Europe, and most of 
the country’s foreign direct investment 
is of European, US and increasingly 
also Chinese origin. Still, for a land-
locked state like Kazakhstan, with most 
of its transportation and energy infra-
structure still oriented towards Russia, 
joining the union was a logical conse-
quence in order to get better access to 
the global market. Moreover, Kazakh-
stan hopes to contain Russia within a 
Public Attitude Towards the EAEU
What is your attitude towards the decision to create the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)?
Sources: Eurasian Development Bank; Igor Zadorin et al., “EDB Integration Barometer – 2017”, Centre for Integration Studies (2017). 
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are only levied once, and that goods 
can then circulate more or less freely 
throughout the economic space. 
The EAEU and China
After concluding a first Free Trade 
Agreement with Vietnam in 2016, 
the EAEU Supreme Council has 
prioritized seven further countries 
with which it seeks to conclude free 
trade agreements: China, Iran, In-
dia, Egypt, Israel, Singapore and Ser-
bia.18 Of these, Iran and China have 
already signed comprehensive eco-
nomic agreements, and Singapore a 
Memorandum of Understanding. In 
the meanwhile, Jordan, Morocco, the 
Faroe Islands, Cuba, Mongolia, South 
Korea, Cambodia, Ecuador, Chile, 
Peru, and Thailand have signed mem-
oranda of cooperation with the EEC 
as well. While the most likely future 
member of the EAEU is Tajikistan, 
countries including Syria, Tunisia, 
the Philippines, Pakistan, and Turkey 
have shown interest in closer cooper-
ation. The EAEU is also engaged in 
talks to establish cooperation with in-
ternational organizations, including 
APEC (of which Russia is a member), 
ASEAN, the Andean Community, the 
CIS, Mercosur, as well as several oth-
er international organizations. The 
EAEU also seeks official observer sta-
tus at the WTO, but has so far failed 
to establish formal relations with the 
European Union.
choosing not to integrate might have 
resulted in potentially painful Russian 
punitive actions for each of these four 
states. 
To be sure, joining the EAEU put ini-
tial stress on the economies of Arme-
nia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, since 
they all had significantly lower tariffs 
and needed to raise these in order to 
match the higher Russian tariffs; also, 
hopes of a quick economic upturn was 
soon followed by initial disillusion-
ment, as the combination of West-
ern sanctions and lower oil prices hit 
not only the Russian economy, but 
also the other EAEU member states 
engaged in trade and economic ex-
changes with Russia. Also, integration 
did not always come at a benefit. This 
was especially the case of Kyrgyzstan, 
which, instead of exporting more of its 
agricultural products after joining the 
common EAEU market, now faced 
sudden though competition from Ka-
zakh, Russian and Belorussian compa-
nies in its own domestic market. 
However, since the union is now the 
common framework to regulate eco-
nomic and trade relations, all mem-
bers may potentially benefit from deals 
negotiated through the EAEU with 
third parties. Conversely, concluding 
free trade deals with the EAEU may be 
interesting for these parties too, since 
the customs union means that duties 
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of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative.20 
The bulk of this investment has been 
directed towards Central Asia. While 
Kazakhstan has been the largest recip-
ient of Chinese investment in abso-
lute terms, China’s engagement also 
has a significant economic impact 
on smaller and less diversified econ-
omies. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, 
China’s share of the country’s foreign 
direct investment has increased to 37 
percent, and China accounts for 28 
percent in Kyrgyzstan’s total trade 
turnover. Due to large loans for var-
ious projects, China holds 41 percent 
of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt.21
Kyrgyzstan’s possible financial depen-
dence highlights the risk small econ-
omies face when incurring too much 
debt. But larger countries also feel 
uneasy about China: While Kazakh-
stan’s political elite emphasizes po-
litical sovereignty, there is an under-
standing that the alliance with Russia 
serves as a counterbalance to Chi-
na’s growing presence in the region, 
which is felt also through the large 
number of Chinese migrant workers 
or cheap Chinese goods undercutting 
domestic producers.22 Moreover, as 
important as recent Chinese financial 
assistance and investments are to the 
Central Asian states, there is a danger 
that these states are building projects 
which might benefit long-term Chi-
nese economic interests, but not the 
After the signing of a provisional free 
trade agreement with Iran in May 
2018 with the purpose to form a full-
scale free trade area in the future, the 
EAEU has also, in May 2018, reached 
an agreement on economic and trade 
cooperation with China. The deal 
with China could be of great impor-
tance should this indeed pave the way 
to the conclusion of a comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement. The two sides 
express their desire to “create the con-
ditions for the development of mutual 
trade relations” and the “promotion 
of economic relations.” The EAEU 
and China are also “[r]ecognizing the 
importance of conjunction of the Eur-
asian Economic Union and the Belt 
and Road initiative as a means of es-
tablishing strong and stable trade rela-
tions in the region.”19 
The purpose of the deal with China is, 
from a Russian perspective, to contain 
Chinese influence in the post-Sovi-
et space, in Central Asia in particu-
lar, and coordinate policy with other 
EAEU members. Agreeing on a com-
mon position towards China might be 
in the interest of all EAEU members. 
Currently, China decides where and in 
which projects it wants to invest, and 
directly negotiates with each EAEU 
member. Over the past seven years, 
China has invested almost 100 billion 
USD in EAEU member countries in 
168 projects, many of which are part 
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and coordination among the EAEU 
member states, which would draw 
them further into the Russian orbit. 
Russia, the EAEU and Europe 
While China and other Asian states 
have been willing to cooperate with 
the EAEU, much of the EAEU’s suc-
cess will ultimately depend on the 
European Union’s attitude. Notwith-
standing the growing economic im-
portance of Asia, the European Union 
still is the EAEU’s biggest trading 
partner, accounting for about half of 
the EAEU’s total exports, and about 
40 percent of its imports (though 
the share of imports from the larger 
Asia-Pacific region is now higher than 
from the European Union). Moscow 
has therefore been pushing for the 
establishment of formal relations be-
tween the EAEU and Brussels, and 
the conclusion of a free trade agree-
ment is one of the declared goals of 
the EEC’s foreign policy. 
Brussels has rejected formal dialogue 
with the EAEU, largely for political 
reasons. It is reluctant to provide le-
gitimacy to an organization domi-
nated by authoritarian states. Also, 
Brussels is loath to establish relations 
with a union seen to be controlled 
by Russia. Formal recognition of the 
EAEU would mean increasing coop-
eration with Russia, a country against 
which the European Union and other 
states in question. Given China’s eco-
nomic might, and since all the states 
of the region are in need of invest-
ment, Beijing’s negotiating position 
is strong. As a result, EAEU member 
states sell their goods on terms most-
ly favorable to China. This includes 
natural resources, which the region 
has in abundance, as well as agricul-
ture, which has become increasingly 
important. 
Since China has increased the import 
of agricultural products, agreeing on 
a common policy might be in the in-
terest of the EAEU. The EAEU frame-
work could also be used to harmonize 
certain standards, as this might stimu-
late business cooperation and remove 
bureaucratic red tape. Direct dialogue 
between the EAEU and China will 
not replace bilateral links; rather, the 
EAEU might help to facilitate better 
mutual relations, and improve the 
EAEU members’ negotiating position. 
Moreover, if the EAEU concludes free 
trade agreements with other import-
ant Asian states, namely India, this 
would open other markets and reduce 
the risk of overdependence on China. 
In sum, should Russia manage to 
convince EAEU members to agree on 
common policies towards China (and 
other third states) this could be to the 
benefit of each country. However, it 
would also mean more commitment 
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as Russia cannot simply impose its 
will on the other members. Howev-
er, since EU membership is currently 
out of the question for most of the 
post-Soviet states, the EAEU is the 
only alternative. As the EAEU has 
been slowly but steadily forming an 
internal market, and economic and 
trade policy increasingly falls under 
the jurisdiction of the union, the ma-
neuvering room of individual states, 
especially when it comes to foreign 
trade affairs, has been shrinking. 
Also, by successfully forging interna-
tional cooperation agreements, the 
EAEU is emerging as a more visible 
Western states have imposed sanctions 
due to Moscow’s aggressive actions 
against Ukraine. In a November 2015 
letter to Vladimir Putin, EU Commis-
sion President Jean-Claude Juncker 
tied recognition of the EAEU to the 
implementation of the Minsk agree-
ments.23 Brussels still perceives the 
EAEU as Russia’s geopolitical tool, and 
seeks to develop ties with states in the 
region along bilateral lines. 
To be sure, Russia is the dominant 
power within the EAEU. But it would 
be wrong to see this union as a pure-
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Georgia, a chance to perform the role 
of intermediaries between the two 
blocs, instead of becoming geopolit-
ical battle zones. 
Rapprochement with the EAEU 
would build confidence on both sides 
and ease current political tensions. 
EU sanctions (and Russian count-
er-sanctions) have hurt Russia, states 
tied to Russia via the EAEU, and 
neighbors engaged in trade and eco-
nomic relations with Russia. Finally, 
tying the whole Eurasian area more 
closely together would facilitate bet-
ter connections between Europe and 
Asia, as it would improve conditions 
for transit and trade. Should relations 
between Russia and Europe improve, 
the whole dynamic on the Eurasian 
continent might change to the ben-
efit of all. Europe should take note 
of the profound changes in its east-
ern neighborhood and reconsider its 
stance toward the EAEU. 
1 Vladimir Putin, Annual Address State to the 
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
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international actor, and the role of its 
permanent bodies, namely the EAEU’s 
Commission, is growing. All of this 
means that the EAEU is unlikely to fall 
apart any time soon. 
While other states and regional organi-
zations, including China, have begun 
to acknowledge these new realities, the 
Europeans have been standing aside, 
thereby risking to lose out on poten-
tial opportunities for trade, foreign 
investment, exchange of know-how 
and technology transfer. In economic 
terms, Brussels and the EAEU would 
benefit from lowering trade barriers 
and harmonizing technical standards. 
A study prepared in 2016 on behalf 
of the Bertelsmann Stiftung predicts 
a substantial increase in mutual trade 
if trade barriers between the EU and 
the EAEU are lowered as part of a free 
trade agreement; eastern EU members, 
most of all the Baltic states, but also 
Slovakia, Finland, Poland, or Germa-
ny, would profit significantly from fre-
er trade.24 Coordination would also be 
fruitful when it comes to the creation 
of a common EAEU-wide energy mar-
ket. Europe is a key consumer of Rus-
sian and Kazakh oil and gas, and any 
changes in the Eurasian energy market 
will have repercussions for consumers 
outside the EAEU.25 Moreover, the 
initiation of a dialogue would give the 
states in between the two economic 
areas, namely Ukraine, Moldova and 
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